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do we find the subject treated as a whole. In other words, by the utilization of legal concepts peculiar to the Anglo-American law, a distinct
contribution to the Roman law can be made. The negative of this situation may likewise be true. For example, neither the Roman nor
our law possesses the well-defined sphere of 'commercial' law, so
familiar in 'civil' law countries. As a result, there has been exceedingly
little study of the Roman commercial law by continentals. The presence
of commercial legal principles in the various fields of Roman private
law, however, is a situation perfectly reasonable to the Anglo-American
lawyer, and studies in business organization, competition, and the like,
should prove exceedingly fruitful. The reviewer regrets" that the authors
did not proceed further along these lines in their comparative law study;
undoubtedly the answer is that individual studies along these lines are
necessary before comparison can be made.
Professors Buckland and McNair deserve our warmest thanks for
presenting us with a distinct contribution to the literature upon the
ancient Roman law.
A.

PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF
-BERG.

Chicago:

LAws.

By

ARTHUR SCHILLER*

GEORGE WILFRED STUM-

T'HE FOUNDATION PRESS, INC.,

1937. pp. XL, 441.

Religion and the conflict of laws have much in common. Each has
-many faiths. Their creeds are evangelical, and their doctrines fre-quently pagan. No heavenly discourse marks their society. Into this
:struggle Stumberg has sent a new textbook on the Conflict of Laws.
He enters as an analyst rather than as an apostle or prophet. This has
been both a happy and an unhappy choice.
It is a happy choice, for he escapes the bias of dogma and achieves
an objective evaluation of theories which emphasizes the unlimitability
-of classifications and the delusion of conceptual consistency. It is an
unhappy choice, as every attempt at impartiality is an unhappy choice,
in that its narration lacks the force and evangelical enthusiasm of faith.
Likewise, in preserving impartiality, the focus often becomes uncertain,
the outline obscure, and the details confused. But these defects should
be minimized. It is more important that the book seeks rude reality
rather than divine doctrine.
Although evidencing preference for the more realistic faiths, Stum*School of Law, Columbia University.
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berg seems to have done them some disservice.
chapter he summarizes their theory as follows:
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In the introductory

"Another group of modern writers assert that the decisions do not support
the theory of enforcement of foreign created rights. They contend that problems of Conflict of Laws should be solved by consideration of expediency."'

Those favoring the "local law" theory have asserted that the decisions
do not support the "foreign-created right" theory, but they would be
the last to assert that the problems of conflicts should be "solved" by
considerations of expediency. Of course, in bne sense all law and society is built upon expediency-that is, the legal machine gets less sand
into society's spinach than does self-help and private warfare. But at
best "expediency" does not explain the legal process nor does it describe
what courts in fact do. It is an argument rather than an explanation.
It is true that in the process of deciding cases a judge, if he is an intelligent judge, will, in addition to the techniques of deductive logic and
judicial precedent, consider the consequences of his decision, but the
techniques will condition the consequences as will the consequences condition the techniques. No adequate description of the process can be
made which destroys this "oneness." It is this demand for greater
accuracy in the description of what judges do in fact which distinguishes
the local law theory. Its concern is with what courts do; not with what
2
they should do.

In the same vein this review might be extended many pages in the
discussion of dangerous generalities in particular conflict situations.3
But this would miss the purpose and scope of Stumberg's book. It is
a volume for the student as yet unfamiliar with the details of the subject.4 It is a reading glass and not a microscope.

There is a malady prevalent among all book reviewers (a malady
to which I succumb) causing them to discuss not the book written, but
the book which might hhve been written. Thus it seems to this reviewer
that the deficiencies of Stumberg's text are deficiencies of the orthodox
approach to the subject. Emphasis, at least in the common law counp. 12.
'See, Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1924) 33
YALE L. J. 457. Perhaps the standard of expedience is suggested in part by Cavers,
A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem (1933) 47 HARV. L. REv. 173, but it is
believed that-even this article does not go so far as Stumberg suggests.
'For example, see, the discussion of multiple-domicile (p. 33) ; multi-jurisdictional torts (p. 163-169) ; contract obligation, performance, and discharge (p. 219) ;
and the problem of Polson v. Stewart (p. 345-348). In all these instances brevity
has resulted in narration rather than analysis.
' Stumberg himself has told us in his preface that the book does not "make any
pretense at being exhaustive." For the student vhci wishes greater detail the author has furnished a bibliography of unusually critical law review articles and
1STUMBERG,

court decisions.
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tries, has been upon the details of substantive law rules as varied by
multi-jurisdictional situations. Conflicts has been treated as a cross
section of domestic law, and many third year student elect it because it
is a "good review course." .This over looks the fact that the significant
problem is not the law to be applied, but rather the technique for applying one or more rules of law from one or more jurisdictions.
Cook has pioneered this approach with law review articles which
are now classic.5 As yet no treatise exists which attacks the problem
significantly. The Restatement was disappointing. 6 And yet a brighter
7
day may be near at hand. Harper and Taintor in their new casebook
have experimented with this approach. For example, the first 350 pages
of their volume are devoted to "Foreign Elements in Legal Relations,"
and their materials are selected to illuminate the judicial process rather
than substantive law structure.8 Experimentation in this direction is
a necessity, and we can only hope the day is not too distant when a
thorough-going treatise will adopt this plan of treatment.
But back to Stumberg. These general remarks should not be regarded as a criticism of his work. It must be remembered that he has
written a student text for use in Conflict courses in American law
schools as those courses are taught today. The book will quench the
thirst of the beginner; upon the expert it will inflict the punishment of
Tantalus.
FRANK E. HORACK JR.*
MATERIALS AND CASES ON THE LAW OF NEGOTIABLE PAPER. By
K. BEUTEL. New York: LAWYERS Co-OPERATIVE PUB-

FREDERICK

LISHING CO.,

1936. ppxv, 786. With a Supplement of Uniform Statutes.

pp. 138.
The book contains less than one third as many reported cases as are
found in Campbell's Cases, and less than one half as many cases as there
' See, supra, note 2 and Cook, Tort Liability and the Conflict of Laws (1935)
35 COLUMBIA LAW REv. 202; Cook, Contracts and the Conflict of Laws (1936) 31
ILL. L. REv. 143; Cook, Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE
L. J. (1933).:
'See, Yntema, The Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws (1936) 36
COLUTBIA LAW REv. 183; Lorenzen and Heilman, The Restatement of the Conflict
of Laws (1935) 83 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 555.
'CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS. Indianapolis. The Bobbs-Merrill Company

(1937).

' Note the classification of materials: Part I-Foreign Elements in Legal Relations; Part II-When Courts Will Adjudicate Controversies Involving Foreign
Elements; Part III-When Foreign Elements Regarded as Legally Insignificant;
Part IV-When Foreign Elements Regarded as Legally Significant (choice of
law).

* Indiana University School of Law.

